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1. Introduction  
Over the past decades, life expectancy in OECD countries has increased strongly, a 
fact that is obviously beneficial for OECD citizens. However, combined with decreas-
ing birth rates this development has led to the well-known problem of population 
ageing. Sustainability of pension systems, and - linked to this problem - the employ-
ability of older workers, are issues that need to be dealt with in the years to come. 
Germany is no exception: the Statistisches Bundesamt has estimated that by 2050, 
40% (ten percentage points more than currently) of the working-age population will 
be 50 to 64 years old (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). While increases in the offi-
cial retirement age have already been introduced, firms still often prefer younger 
workers over older ones, especially in recruitment (see for example Eichhorst, 2006; 
Heywood et al., 2008). One of the main problems in German labour markets is early 
exit. Participation rates decline rapidly after the age of 60, dropping to 25% for men 
at an age of 63 and to 10% for women (OECD, 2005). Moreover, not only are the 
labour-force participation rates of those between 55 and 64 lower, but the unem-
ployment rates in that age group are also higher than on average. Long term unem-
ployment for individuals older than 55 is also very high.1 
As a result, an important segment of the working population is not working. The 
OECD (2005) has estimated that 11.7% of the German working-age population are 
‘mobilisable labour resources’; and two-thirds of this percentage is attributable to 
excess non-employment of older workers. Quite a few studies have investigated the 
factors which affect the employment of older workers, all showing that the institu-
tional context is of high relevance. On the labour supply side the generosity of un-
employment compensation and pension systems influence participation and em-
ployment decisions (Schmidt, 1995; Riphahn/Schmidt, 1997; Eichhorst et al., 2004). 
On the labour demand side companies have to deal with relatively non-transparent 
age-specific regulations (Pfarr et al., 2005; Brussig et al., 2006; RWI/ISG, 2005).  
Wage rigidity and increasing age-earnings profile have also been identified as a 
possible determinant of low employment rates of older workers in Germany. Wages 
for older workers could be higher due to wage bargaining and /or the prevalence of 
delayed payment contracts2, potentially leading to age-earning profiles which differ 
from age-productivity profiles. This paper uses cognitive abilities as an indicator of 
productivity potential in order to see whether productivity decreases with age and 
how wages adapt to this profile. Moreover, we will decompose wage differentials 
between older and younger workers in explained and unexplained components in 
order to test whether older workers earn more or less than younger workers, control-
ling for a standard set of covariates known to influence wages and our cognitive 
                                                
1  See Figure A1 in the Appendix.  
2  Implicit contracts between employer and employees, which imply that employees are underpaid at 
the beginning and overpaid at the end of the contract. The purpose of such contracts is to discoura-
ge worker shirking (Lazear, 1979). 
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ability variables. Section 2 below gives a brief overview of the literature to date and 
discusses evidence on age-productivity and age-earnings profiles. In section 3 our 
data, the German Socio-economic Panel Study and our methodology is described. 
Section 4 presents our results and the final section 5 concludes.  
2. Age-earnings and productivity profiles 
2.1 Age-productivity profiles 
The main difficulty in establishing the relationship between age and productivity is 
the measurement of productivity. Skirbekk (2004) offers an extensive review of pro-
ductivity measurement and age productivity profiles. The most common measure-
ment used in the studies on age and productivity are supervisors’ ratings of employ-
ees’ productivity.  These studies show little or no relationship between productivity 
and the age of employees.  However, this measurement of productivity may be bi-
ased, since supervisors may evaluate older workers more generously as a reward 
for past achievements or as a reward for loyalty (Salthouse/Maurer, 1996). Further-
more, there is a selection problem, since poorly rated individuals may lose their job 
before reaching older ages.   
Early studies from the 1950s and 1960s are based on more objective measures of 
productivity like production records. In this case productivity is measured counting 
the number of items produced by an individual within a given time. Analyses based 
on this measurement of productivity show increase in performance with age until the 
middle of the working life and decline of productivity after this peak (Mark, 1957; 
Kutscher./Walker, 1960). The problem with this measurement is that output is not 
always easy to measure for all employees.  
Some recent studies are based on employer-employee datasets and analyse the 
impact of the age structure of a firm’s labour force on the firm’s output (Crepon et 
al., 2002; Ilmakunnas et al., 2004). These studies show that firms with an older age 
structure are less productive than firms with a younger age structure. However, it is 
difficult to isolate the effect of age structure on the firm’s output from other compo-
nents. Productivity for exceptional performers (like scientists and writers), also sug-
gest an inverted U-shaped productivity function. The peak of the productivity func-
tion is between 20 and 40 varying according to the discipline (Jones, 2005; Lehman, 
1953; Simonton, 1997). 
As we see, productivity is difficult to measure and this constrains the analysis of the 
relationship between productivity and wages. Instead of analysing the effects of pro-
ductivity on wages, the empirical labour economics literature has therefore often 
focused on the relationship between age and wages. This is perhaps the closest 
possible related link as productivity seems to be correlated with age. The next sec-
tion will present some of the most important evidence from that literature with spe-
cial reference to interpretations linking age earnings profiles and productivity.  
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2.2 Age earnings profiles and productivity 
In empirical research the link between age and wages has been investigated innu-
merable times. The standard way of analysing this relationship is based on Becker's 
human capital model (Becker, 1962) and Mincer's application of the theoretical hu-
man capital framework in the form of wage regressions (Mincer, 1962, 1974). In its 
original form a wage regression explains earnings as a function of education and 
experience, with experience in practice often being proxied by age. According to the 
theory of human capital an increase in wages with experience is explained by the 
acquisition of general skills (and therefore increasing productivity) while working. 
Positively sloped experience-earnings profiles are interpreted as being caused by 
increases in worker productivity. However, the increase is usually found to decline 
with further experience. Hurd was the first to propose that there is an inverse U-
shaped age earnings profile (Hurd, 1971). However, it is has not been clarified 
whether the negative effect of age at the end of the working life is due to the decline 
in cognitive abilities or to other factors (Myck, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Average hourly earnings 
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Source: SOEP (own calculations) 
Along the same lines wage regressions usually include tenure, which is typically 
found to have a positive effect on wages as well (holding experience constant). This 
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is sometimes explained by the acquisition of skills on the job, with workers building 
up firm (and/or job) specific human capital. Within the context of human capital 
models the problems surrounding the financing of transferable skills may lead to 
problems in interpreting the estimated coefficients on the tenure variable. As firm 
specific skills are not transportable, investments should be shared by the firm and 
the worker (Becker, 1962; Parsons, 1972; Hashimoto, 1981). The resulting earnings 
profile will hence be relatively steep and will not reflect productivity.  
Moreover, there are also other potential explanations for steep earnings profiles, 
including matching and efficiency wage theory. In matching models, individuals 
switch jobs as long as they are able to receive job offers which provide a better fit 
between their skills and the job (Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979; Flinn, 1986). Once 
a good match has been found, tenure starts to increase as there is no further incen-
tive to leave the firm, leading to positively sloped tenure-earnings profiles independ-
ent of worker skill. According to Lazear (1979) and Hutchens (1986) there are im-
plicit contracts between employer and employees which imply that employees are 
underpaid at the beginning and overpaid at the end of the contract. The purpose of 
such contracts is to discourage worker shirking. The honest worker will remain with 
the firm in order to receive her reward of a high wage, while the worker who shirks 
runs the risk of being caught out and fired before obtaining the high wage. These 
contracts are more suited to firms where output cannot be costlessly observed. 
Hutchens (1986) argues that longer contracts are preferred by firms who require 
such payment schemes so that there is no interest in hiring new older workers.  
Freeman (1977) and Harris/Holmstrom (1982) argue that the growth of wages with 
tenure has an insurance motive. According to the authors, firms insure workers 
against low productivity later in their careers. The expected value of the wage later 
in their careers exceeds expected marginal productivity and this gap is financed by 
an excess of marginal productivity over wages in early periods (Altonji/Shakotko, 
1985).  
Guasch/Weiss (1980, 1982) argue that increases in wages with tenure help to solve 
adverse selection problems when recruiting workers. The authors assume that 
workers know more about their abilities than firms do; therefore, firms may offer 
wages below marginal product in the period during which workers are evaluated and 
a wage above marginal product in subsequent periods to those workers who present 
higher productivity.  This wage structure will discourage unproductive workers from 
applying (Altonji/Shakotko, 1987). 
There is also another way of interpreting the increasing cross-sectional wage-tenure 
profile. It can also be the case that better workers are more likely to remain longer in 
their jobs, therefore increasing wages with tenure would not be explained by the 
theories outlined above but by the fact that good labour market matches are related 
to longer tenures. Altonji/Shakotko (1987) suggest estimation approaches that ac-
count for this endogeneity problem and they conclude that indeed job shopping and 
general labour market experience (as suggested by the human capital theory) ac-
count for most wage growth over a career.  
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The effect that tenure has on wages can be also country specific. There are several 
factors that may help German workers in maintaining their earnings (and returns to 
tenure) when they change jobs in comparison to the US (Couch, 2003).3 Given that 
the rate of unionization in Germany is approximately four times that of the US, 
transportability of tenure premiums might be stronger for German workers. On the 
other hand, workers dismissal in Germany is costly, implying that employers will be 
more selective when they hire a worker. In this context, workers who lose their jobs 
may be marked as undesirable, which has an effect on their future earnings. Figure 
2 shows that the wage tenure profile is not as obvious as the wage-age profile. Ac-
cordingly the evidence is very mixed. Couch (2003) reports that tenure profiles in 
Germany peak later than in the U.S. – an incentive for German workers to stay with 
their firm. Likewise Zwick (2008) reports that in an international comparison, Ger-
man firms pay relatively high seniority wages. Dustmann/Meghir (2005), however, 
find returns to tenure for skilled workers only. Using the Altonji-Shakotko approach, 
Orlowski/Riphahn (2007) are even unable to detect some significant returns to ten-
ure for Germany. 
Figure 2: Average hourly earnings 
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Source: SOEP (own calculations) 
In order to have a more complete picture about wages formation, not only returns to 
tenure (specific skills) and experience (general skills) are necessary but also returns 
                                                
3 For a recent study on returns to tenure in the US see Shaw/Lazear 2007. 
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to cognitive skills as an indicator of productivity potential. In this study we analyse 
whether wage formation responds to cognitive abilities and whether the remunera-
tion of cognitive abilities differs between groups of workers. In this way, we contrib-
ute to the debate about how wage formation responds to productivity developments. 
 
 
2.3 Cognitive abilities as an indicator of productivity potential 
Cognitive or mental abilities refer to broad aspects of intellectual functioning (Skir-
bekk, 2004). These include reasoning, spatial orientation, numerical capabilities, 
verbal abilities and problem solving.4 These abilities together with physical abilities, 
education and job experience determine an individual’s productivity potential. This, 
combined with the company’s characteristics, determine job performance. 
 
Figure 3: Outline of Factors Affecting Job Performance 
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Source: Skirbekk (2004). 
In modern societies, where physical strength has lost much of its importance, cogni-
tive skills are a good indicator of productivity (Skirbekk 2008). In most jobs what 
determines productivity potential is the ability to acquire new knowledge in a rapidly 
changing workplace. It has been tested in the literature how mental abilities affect 
                                                
4  The most commonly used measurement of cognitive abilities is the IQ score.  
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job performance. Schmidt/Hunter (1998) analyse how different individual character-
istics, such as education, work experience and general mental abilities, relate to job 
performance. The authors find that mental ability predicts a person’s job perform-
ance better than any other observable characteristic. Currie/Thomas (1999) and 
Tyler et al. (2000) find that mental abilities at young ages determine adult income 
levels after adjusting for socio-economic status. 
A large body of evidence supports the idea that cognitive abilities decline from some 
stage in adulthood (e.g. van Ours, 2009; Czaja/Sharit, 1993; Gelderblom/De Koning, 
2002)5. Verhaegen/Salthouse (1997) present a meta-analysis of 91 studies that de-
scribe how mental abilities develop with age. These studies show that important 
cognitive abilities like reasoning, speed and episodic memory decline significantly by 
the age of 50. However, not all abilities follow the same decline pattern. While fluid 
abilities (learning, perceptual speed and reasoning abilities) decline considerably 
over the life cycle, crystallized abilities (vocabulary size and semantic meaning) re-
main stable (Schaie, 1994). This could mean that during normal ageing there will be 
a decrease in productivity in certain tasks; but there will be certain tasks in which 
productivity will remain stable or even increase. Furthermore, according to the litara-
ture (e.g. Roßnagel 2009; 2010) during the right lifelong learning strategies enable 
workers to maintain the relevant competences over working life.  
Skirbekk (2008) in an innovative study estimates changes in productivity potential by 
analysing not only the age variation in individuals’ abilities but also the changing 
importance of these abilities in the labour market. The assumption of the author is 
that the age-productivity curve is not static but changes with labour market require-
ments (e.g. Autor/Siegfried/Dorn, 2009; Spitz-Oener, 2006). The author concludes 
that taking into account both aspects, the productivity potential decreases in the 
latter half of the working life. In the next section we will now introduce the data we 
are using to measure cognitive abilities. 
3. Analysis  
3.1 Data 
We use two indicators for cognitive abilities from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) to analyse whether wages respond to productivity changes with age. The 
SOEP is a representative, interdisciplinary and longitudinal survey of the German 
population (SOEP Group 2001).The panel was started in 1984, and has been re-
peated yearly since then. The only year for which cognitive tests are available is the 
year 2006. In that year the survey covered a total of some 22,000 individuals from 
about 12,500 households. Approximately a quarter of all respondents participated in 
the cognitive tests, of whom almost 40% were older than 50. 
                                                
5  It is beyond the scope of the paper to review psychological discussions surrounding the definition 
and measurement of cognitive abilities. See e.g. Carroll (1993); Lang (2005) and Lang et al. (2007) . 
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Measuring productivity is a difficult task and traditional studies using supervisor rat-
ings, piece rates, employer-employee data sets or simply age specific wage and 
employment patterns are plagued with the problem that "In general, there does not 
exist any definite way of estimating how productivity varies by age which does not 
entail a large degree of uncertainty or where the findings are universally valid" Skir-
bekk (2004). In order to supply researchers with information on productivity, the 
SOEP study selected two ultra-short tests for application, which use the theoretical 
framework of life-span psychology (Lang, 2005; Lang et al., 2007). This theoretical 
framework distinguishes between two components of intellectual functioning: the 
mechanics and the pragmatics of intellectual ability, corresponding to the concept of 
crystallized and fluid abilities. The mechanics of cognition are capacities related to 
information processing, and the pragmatics of intellectual ability refer to educational 
and experience-related competences. Both components, taken together, represent 
the cognitive abilities that are required for performing competently over the life 
course.  
The mechanics of cognition are tested using the Symbol-Digit-Test (SDT) which 
requires individuals to match numbers with graphical symbols as quickly as possi-
ble. The tests end after 90 seconds, and the maximum amount of correctly assigned 
digits provides an estimate of the respondent’s perceptual information-processing 
speed (Smith, 1995; Lang et al., 2007). Knowledge-based word fluency is assessed 
with the Animal Naming Task. The participants name as many different animals as 
possible during a 90 second interval (Lindenberger and Baltes, 1995; Lang et al., 
2007). 
For our analysis, we select only individuals who carry out these tests. Furthermore, 
selection was restricted to men of working age (20-65) and who are working. Sam-
ples B, D and G of the SOEP were excluded; these are West-German foreigners, 
immigrants and high income sample respectively. Finally, self employment and pub-
lic employment were also excluded. These selections were carried out in order to 
generate a homogenous group in terms of wage formation. In the final sample ap-
proximately 1000 individuals were included. In Table A1 in the appendix, some de-
scriptive of the sample is presented. 
In Figures 4 and 5 we plot the relationship between the average results of these 
tests and the average age of the respondents. We observe that while the results of 
the SDT decrease dramatically with age, the results of the Animal Naming Test pre-
sent more variation and the decline with age is not that pronounced.6 These results 
fit well with what the literatures says. While fluid abilities decline dramatically with 
age, crystallized abilities remain more stable over the life cycle. Anger and Heineck 
(Anger/Heineck, 2006; Heineck/Anger, 2008) were the first to use this data set. They 
report a positive effect of the fluid intelligence (or mechanics of cognition) that van-
ishes once occupational status and industry are controlled for. Pragmatics of cogni-
                                                
6  Appendix Table A2 reports means and standard deviations for different age groups used later on in 
our analysis. 
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tion did not influence earnings positively in their estimations, but they also detected 
a negative relationship between cognitive abilities and unemployment. 
Figure 4:  Average Symbol-Digit-Test results 
 
 
10
15
20
25
30
35
Av
er
ag
e 
SD
T 
R
es
ul
ts
20 30 40 50 60 70
Age of Individual
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Figure 5: Average Animal Naming Test results 
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Source: SOEP (own calculations) 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to investigate whether differentials in wages between younger and older 
individuals are ‘justified’, we use the methodology developed by Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973). According to Oaxaca and Blinder, any wage differential between two 
groups of people (defined by gender, race, ethnicity etc) can be decomposed into 
two parts. The first is explained by differences in the human capital endowments of 
both groups, the second reflects differences in prices, that is the remuneration of 
these endowments. This latter element is often interpreted as an estimate of wage 
discrimination (Beblo et al., 2003). According to this differentiation,  potential differ-
ences in the wages of younger and older individuals may be derived from both dif-
ferences in human capital endowments and other job-related variables (endowment 
effect) and from a difference in the values that are assigned to older and younger 
workers’ characteristics (remuneration effect). Among the endowment factors con-
sidered in the literature are educational attainment, work experience, tenure, occu-
pational status and firm characteristics. We consider furthermore the cognitive abili-
ties of the individuals. It is important to have a wage determination model which is 
as precise as possible in order to determine whether there is wage discrimination. 
The basic method applies to the determination of wage differentials at the mean, 
and it was developed for cross-sectional data. Wage regressions of younger and 
older workers are estimated: 
O
i
OO
i
O
i XW εβ +=ln  (1) 
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Y
i
YY
i
Y
i XW εβ +=ln  (2), 
where the superscripts O and Y indicate older and younger respectively. The wage 
at the mean for each group is: 
OOO XW βˆln =   (3) 
YYY XW βˆln =   (4). 
Where 
Oi
N
i
O
NWW
O
/lnln
1
∑=
=  and NO stands for the number of older workers in the 
sample. The vector 
O
X represents the average human capital characteristics of the 
older workers. If we assume that the competitive price vector in the market is the 
wage structure of the younger workers , we can compute the predicted mean 
wage for older workers with coefficient estimates from the young workers’ wage re-
gression and average characteristics of older workers: 
Yβˆ
YOO XW βˆln 1 =   (5) 
 
The wage gap can be decomposed by calculating two differences. The first differ-
ence 
OY
WW 1lnln − indicates by how much the mean wage for young workers ex-
ceeds the mean hypothetical wage for older workers in the absence of discrimina-
tion. The second term, 
OO
WW lnln 1 − shows the distance between the hypothetical 
wage for older workers and their actual mean wage: 
{ } ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −=− OOOY
wagegap
OY
WWWWWW lnlnlnlnlnln 11444 3444 21
 (6) 
{ } { }OOOYOYYY XXXX ββββ ˆˆˆˆ −+−=  
( ) ( )44 344 2144 344 21
effectonremunerati
OYO
effectendowment
OYY XXX βββ ˆˆˆ −+−=
 
The first term of the right side of the equation (6) presents the endowment effect of 
the wage differential between older and younger workers; it arises from differences 
in the average characteristics. The second term represents the remuneration effect 
due to differences in estimated coefficients (discrimination). If older and younger 
workers had the same characteristics at the mean, the existing wage gap would only 
be caused by the difference in the remuneration of these characteristics. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Wage regressions 
Before decomposing wage differentials by age, we present wage regression esti-
mates for all workers. Apart from the more or less standard controls, we include the 
two covariates SDT (Symbol-Digit-Test) and ANT (Animal-Naming-Test). As dis-
cussed above, SDT controls for fluid abilities or the mechanics of intellectual ability 
and ANT controls for crystallized abilities or knowledge based pragmatics. In order 
to see whether these indicators of productivity potential have different effects for 
different groups, we also test whether interactions between cognitive abilities and 
other characteristics (like age, occupational status, tenure, education and unem-
ployment experience) are significant. In Table 1a we present the results of the basic 
specification (without interaction terms). Being older, living in West Germany, educa-
tion, tenure and working in a large firm have positive effects on hourly earnings. On 
the other hand, unemployment history and lower occupational status have a nega-
tive effect on wages. In this first model we also observe that cognitive abilities have 
no significant effect on wages. This corresponds to Anger/Heineck (2008), who re-
port that effects vanish once occupation and industry are controlled for.   
Still, it could be possible that cognitive abilities (or our measures thereof) are rele-
vant for some sub-groups only. In order to test this, we run the same model with 
interactions. In Table 1b we interact cognitive abilities with age, occupational status 
and tenure. Just a few interactions are significant, which we are going to discuss in 
turn. We observe that the interaction terms of the Animal Naming Test with our age 
dummies are positive and significant. Taking into account that the reference cate-
gory is the youngest age group (20-30 years old) this means that crystallized abili-
ties become more relevant with age. Or in other words, while for the youngest work-
ers crystallized abilities are of less relevance in the determination of wages, older 
individuals with better crystallized abilities earn more. However, this result is 
stronger for workers between 31 and 40 than for those between 41 and 65.  
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Table 1a: Wage regressions for men. Basic Model (without interactions) 
 Basic Model  
 Coefficient   Std. Error 
Age 31-40 0.193*** (0.05)    
Age 41-50 0.205*** (0.05)    
Age 51-65 0.212*** (0.06)    
Region (=1 west) 0.353*** (0.04)    
Vocational Training 0.148*** (0.05)    
College Education 0.353*** (0.06)    
0 < Unemp. experience <=1 -0.038    (0.04)    
1 < Unemp. experience <=3 -0.138**  (0.05)    
Unemp. experience >3 -0.265*** (0.08)    
1 < Tenure <=5 0.115**  (0.05)    
5 < Tenure <=10 0.207*** (0.06)    
Tenure >10 0.255*** (0.06)    
Occ. status (lower professionals) -0.178*** (0.05)    
Occ. status (clerical and service) -0.306*** (0.05)    
Occ. status (skilled manual) -0.313*** (0.04)    
Occ. status (manual) -0.506*** (0.07)    
Firm size >=20 & <200 0.156*** (0.04)    
Firm size >=200 & <2000 0.259*** (0.04)    
Firm size >=2000 0.300*** (0.04)    
Symbol Digit Test -0.000    (0.00)    
Animal Naming Test 0.001    (0.00)    
Constant 1.921*** (0.09)    
N.  743.000 
r2 0.505   
 
Note: Unemployment experience and tenure in years. Reference categories: age 20-30, basic school-
ing, no unemployment experience, tenure < 1 year, higher professionals, small firm with less than 20 
employees. 
*** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level and * at the 10% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP data for 2006. 
The other clearly significant interaction we find is between the Symbol Digit Test and 
tenure. Once workers have been in the firm for more than a year, they get paid more 
as their fluid ability increases. We find the largest positive effect of fluid abilities on 
hourly earnings for workers who have been with their firm for over ten years. It is, 
however, impossible to tell from these estimations whether the positive interaction is 
simply the result of individuals with better fluid abilities being more likely to stay in 
the firm. If more productive individuals stay (which is what we would expect) they 
are also likely to be paid more. 
Finally, we also observe some significant interactions of both fluid and crystallized 
abilities with occupational status. Manual workers with higher cognitive abilities earn 
less than those with lower cognitive abilities. Cognitive abilities seem to be less im-
portant in those occupations and potentially even negative for earnings, although the 
effects are relatively minor. Tentatively, we could also argue that for manual workers 
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other productivity factors apart from cognitive abilities still seem to matter more. 
Overall, our results confirm that remuneration adapts to productivity potential at least 
for some groups of workers, with a higher productivity potential leading to higher 
wages.  
We also experimented with interactions between education and unemployment ex-
perience. These interaction terms have no significant effect on earnings as can be 
seen from Table 1c. 
Table 1b: Wage regressions for men. Interactions of cognitive abilities with 
age, occup. Status, and tenure 
   
Interactions with 
Age 
Interactions with Occu-
pational Status 
Interactions with 
Tenure 
SDT × Age 31-40 -0.005    . . 
 (0.00)    . . 
SDT × Age 41-50 -0.004    . . 
 (0.00)    . . 
SDT × Age 51-65 -0.001    . . 
 (0.00)    . . 
ANT × Age 31-40 0.012*** . . 
 (0.00)    . . 
ANT × Age 41-50 0.009**  . . 
 (0.00)    . . 
ANT × Age 51-65 0.008*   . . 
 (0.00)    . . 
SDT × Lower professionals . -0.004    . 
 . (0.00)    . 
SDT × Clerical and service . 0.001    . 
 . (0.00)    . 
SDT × Skilled manual . 0.003    . 
 . (0.00)    . 
SDT × Manual . -0.010*   . 
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Table 1b:  Wage regressions for men. Interactions of cognitive abilities with 
age, occup. Status, and tenure (continued) 
   Interactions with 
Age 
Interactions with Occu-
pational Status 
Interactions with 
Tenure 
 . (0.01)    . 
ANT × Lower professionals . -0.002    . 
 . (0.00)    . 
ANT × Clerical and service . 0.000    . 
 . (0.00)    . 
ANT × Skilled manual . -0.006*   . 
 . (0.00)    . 
ANT × Manual . 0.006    . 
 . (0.01)    . 
SDT × Tenure (>1 and <=5) . . 0.011**  
 . . (0.00)    
SDT × Tenure (>5 and <=10) . . 0.009**  
 . . (0.00)    
SDT × Tenure (>10) . . 0.013*** 
 . . (0.00)    
ANT  × Tenure (>1 and <=5) . . 0.002    
 . . (0.00)    
ANT × Tenure (>5 and <=10) . . -0.002    
 . . (0.00)    
ANT ×Tenure (>10) . . -0.004    
 . . (0.00)    
Constant 2.018*** 1.911*** 2.113*** 
 (0.10)    (0.09)    (0.11)    
N.  743.000 743.000 743.000 
r2 0.512    0.513  0.517  
Note: SDT = Symbol-Digit-Test; ANT = Animal Naming Test. For other controls see Table 1a. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level and * at the 10% 
level.  Source: Own calculations based on SOEP data for 2006. 
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Table 1c: Wage regressions for men. Interactions of cognitive abilities with 
education and unemployment experience 
 
Interactions with Educa-
tion 
Interactions with Unemployment 
Experience 
SDT × Vocational Training -0.001    . 
 (0.00)    . 
SDT × College Education 0.005    . 
 (0.00)    . 
ANT  × Vocational Training 0.005    . 
 (0.00)    . 
ANT  × College Education 0.005    . 
 (0.00)    . 
SDT × Unemp. exp. (>0 and <=1) . -0.004    
 . (0.00)    
SDT × Unemp. exp.(>1 and <=3) . -0.005    
 . (0.00)    
SDT × Unemp. exp.(>3) . -0.010    
 . (0.01)    
ANT  × Unemp. exp. (>0 and <=1) . 0.003    
 . (0.00)    
ANT  × Unemp. exp. (>1 and <=3) . 0.004    
 . (0.01)    
ANT  × Tenure (>3) . 0.003    
 . (0.01)    
Constant 2.005*** 1.903*** 
 (0.11)    (0.09)    
N.  743.000 743.000 
r2 0.510    0.508   
 
Note: SDT = Symbol-Digit-Test; ANT = Animal Naming Test. For other included controls see Table 1a. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level and * at 
the 10% level. Source: Own calculations based on SOEP data for 2006. 
4.2 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
Next, we decompose wage differentials between older and younger workers in ex-
plained and unexplained components. This decomposition is based on our basic 
specification without interactions (compare Table 1a above), but now we split up the 
sample by age groups instead of including age dummies. The results are presented 
in Table 2. We observe that older individuals (51-65) earn slightly more than 
younger individuals (aged 31-50). The log wage is 2.77 for older and 2.72 for 
younger workers, although this difference is not significant. Decomposing the wage 
differential we find that endowments and remuneration work in different directions.  
The first explained part of the wage differential reflects the mean change in older 
workers' wages if they had the same characteristics as younger workers. The effect 
is negative and significant, showing that with the same characteristics as younger 
workers, older workers would earn considerably less. As theory predicts, older 
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workers have moved on in their career which leads to higher earnings. The second 
term quantifies the change in older workers' wages when applying younger workers' 
coefficients to older workers characteristics. According to our estimate, older work-
ers compensation should be higher if remuneration were the same, so older workers 
are in effect being discriminated against. By comparing the wages of older workers 
(51-65) with those of middle aged workers (41-50) we obtain similar results. Older 
workers earn slightly more, but this difference would be larger if coefficients for older 
and younger workers were the same. Summing up, we find that although older 
workers' endowment and wages are higher, they are still being discriminated against 
on average and would earn more if treated as younger workers.7  
Table 2:  Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: older workers (51-65) vs. younger 
workers (31-50)  
 
 Coeffient Robust Std. Err. z P>z 
Differential      
Prediction_1 2.732 0.022 126.080 0.000 
Prediction_2 2.775 0.039 70.700 0.000 
Difference -0.044 0.045 -0.970 0.330 
Decomposition    
Explained -0.106 0.051 -2.070 0.038 
Unexplained 0.063 0.047 1.340 0.179 
 
a Prediction_1 = predicted wages of younger workers (31-50). 
b Prediction_2 = predicted wages of older workers (51-65) 
Note: SDT = Symbol-Digit-Test; ANT = Animal Naming Test. For other included controls see Table 1a. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level and * at 
the 10% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP data for 2006. 
                                                
7  Obviously older workers are more likely to have achieved higher tenure. So we also experimented 
with our specification, leaving out our tenure dummies (<1 year, 1-5, 5-10, >10). The pattern of re-
sults remains the same.  
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Table 3:  Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: older workers (51-65) vs. middle 
aged workers (41-50) 
 Coef. Robust Std. Err. z P>z 
Differential      
Prediction_1 2.733 0.030 91.010 0.000 
Prediction_2 2.775 0.039 70.690 0.000 
Difference -0.042 0.049 -0.850 0.395 
Decomposition    
Explained -0.130 0.074 -1.77 0.077 
Unexplained 0.088 0.064 1.370 0.172 
 
a Prediction_1 = predicted wages of younger workers (31-50). 
b Prediction_2 = predicted wages of older workers (51-65) 
Note: SDT = Symbol-Digit-Test; ANT = Animal Naming Test. For other included controls see Table 1a. 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level and * at 
the 10% level. 
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP data for 2006. 
5. Conclusions 
Older workers have left the German labour market in large numbers over the past 
decades. Apart from institutional settings, wages paid to older workers are an impor-
tant determinant of labour market participation. High seniority wages may even lock 
out older employees from jobs (Zwick, 2008). In this paper we moved one step fur-
ther in trying to understand the determinants of older workers wages. Based on the 
theory of human capital and job search, we first use cognitive abilities as indicators 
of productivity in our wage regressions. Certainly, our measures of cognitive abilities 
and productivity are not undisputed, but the effects we found are plausible and fit in 
with economic theory, although productivity indicators as available in the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) are only minor determinants of individual wages 
(compare also Heineck/Anger 2008). By introducing interactions in the wage regres-
sions, we find that cognitive abilities are a significant determinant of worker com-
pensation, but only for certain groups. As theory and common sense predicts, older 
workers with better crystallized abilities (or knowledge-based word fluency) earn 
more. Moreover, workers that have been in the firm for more than a year, get paid 
more the higher their fluid ability.  
In a second stage, we analyse wage differentials between younger and older work-
ers using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. What we obtain is that older workers 
earn slightly more than younger workers. Although this wage differential can be ex-
plained by older workers' endowments – considering as endowments standard wage 
determinants and cognitive abilities – older workers would earn even more if they 
were paid as younger workers. Our estimates show that returns to endowments dif-
fer between both groups to the disadvantage of older workers, even when control-
ling for productivity. Whether this is really discrimination or still unmeasured ability 
we cannot say, as the available data just allows a cross sectional analysis. From 
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what we have learned from the SOEP data, we conclude that older workers have 
more problems in achieving high returns to their endowments than younger workers. 
This negative effect of age at the end of the working life does not fit in with the the-
ory of deferred payment. As even better measures of productivity and longitudinal 
data sets will hopefully become available in the future, we will be able to learn more 
about the linkages between wages, productivity and old age. Only longitudinal stud-
ies that measure abilities and wages over the working life could potentially settle the 
disputes about seniority wages.   
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7. Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptives 
  Mean Std. Dev. 
Hourly earnings 16.04 9.41 
Age  42.20 10.28 
Region (=1 west) 83.79 . 
No vocational training 9.88 . 
Vocational training 71.54 . 
College education 18.58 . 
No unemployment experience  65.99 . 
Unemployment experience (>0+<=1) 21.44 . 
Unemployment experience (>1+<=3) 8.38 . 
Unemployment experience  (>3) 4.19 . 
Tenure (<=1) 11.59 . 
Tenure (>1+<=5) 23.71 . 
Tenure (>5+<=10) 22.21 . 
Tenure (>10) 42.49 . 
Occ. St. (higher prof.) 21.85 . 
Occ. St. (lower prof.) 15.65 . 
Occ. St. (clerical and serv.) 12.95 . 
Occ. St. (skilled manual) 42.57 . 
Occ. St. (manual) 6.98 . 
Firm size <20 25.08 . 
Firm size >=20 & <200 28.67 . 
Firm size >=200 & <2000 22.28 . 
Firm size >=2000 23.96 . 
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Table A2: Descriptives 
    Mean Std. Dev.  
Symbol-Digit-Tests results Age 20-30 22,87 18,40 
 Age 31-40 24,59 14,12 
 Age 41-50 22,86 13,96 
  Age 51-65 18,53 14,66 
Animal Naming Tests results Age 20-30 17,00 14,95 
 Age 31-40 22,70 14,27 
 Age 41-50 21,32 13,28 
  Age 51-65 18,47 14,06 
Average hourly earnings Age 20-30 9,17 3,94 
 Age 31-40 16,35 6,64 
 Age 41-50 16,47 7,20 
  Age 51-65 17,64 8,55 
 
Figure A1: Unemployment rates (in %), age 55-64 
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Source: OECD, both sexes. 
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